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Abstract: The paper gives an overview of the challenges and practices in the field of 
climate protection in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). A strong link between climate 
change issues and energy sector reforms in the course of socio-economic transition has 
been explored. The experiences from some of the more developed and fast reforming CEE 
countries should serve as guideposts for all other countries in the region. The potential of 
Flexible Mechanisms and climate protection opportunities has been analyzed. The 
emphasis has been made on the non-Kyoto protocol countries, primarily on Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the options they may have. A proposal for Climate Protection Policy 
Framework for Serbia has been made.     
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 There is a wide scientific consensus that global climate change is an outcome of 
human activities (IPCC, 2001b), and that the social and economic costs either of 
mitigation or adaptation to its various impacts will be very high (OECD, 2001). There is 
clear evidence that during a hundred years period, from 1890s to 1990s, a steady rise in 
average global temperature was 0.6 °C (IPCC, 2001a). The 1990s were the warmest 
decade since the beginning of instrumental measuring in 1860, and according to the 
indirect data, obtained from proxy measurements, 1990s were the warmest decade in the 
last millennium (IPCC 2001b). In the contemporary science it is, also, broadly accepted 
that the latest climate changes are closely related to the increased atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gasses 
(GHG).  
 In 1988, discerning the potential danger, the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), jointly 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with an aim to 
assess all the available scientific information about climate change, its socio-economic 
impacts, and potential response strategies. As a result of the IPCC activities, in 1992, 
over 180 countries at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro adopted the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC presented an 
international legal framework for joint GHG emission reductions. At the third annual 
meeting of countries that had ratified the Convention (COP 3), in 1997, in Kyoto, a 
Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted, so called the Kyoto Protocol (KP, 1997). The 
main accomplishment of the Protocol is definition of legally binding quantified 
constraints on GHG emissions from industrialized countries. The Kyoto Protocol defines 
allowable amounts of emissions, for each industrialized country, or Party, in terms of 
assigned amounts for the commitment period from 2008 to 2012. Annex A of the 
Protocol lists GHG and their sources. The commitments, in a form of quantified emission 
reductions (as percentages of the base period levels), apply to the countries that had 
ratified the Protocol, and are listed in Annex B.  In order to enter into force the Protocol 
must be ratified (approved, accepted or acceded) by 55 Parties, accounting for minimum 
55% of 1990 GHG emission level1(KP, 1997 Art.25).  
 The Kyoto Protocol stipulates marked-based flexible mechanisms, for 
international transfer of emissions. By allowing emission reductions to take place where 
they have the lowest possible costs, the Kyoto flexible mechanisms are aimed to assist 
UNFCCC Annex 1 countries to achieve their targets in a cost-efficient way2. 
                                                 
1 As of September 11, 2003, 117 countries have ratified the Protocol,  ( 32 as Annex I parties) accounting 
for 44.2% of 1990 emissions.   
http://unfccc.int/resource/kpthermo.html 
2  It should be mentioned that, in spite of intentions, the Kyoto Protocol does not guarantee full cost–
effectiveness of international GHG emission reductions. A maximum cost-effective international emissions 
trading program is not compatible with the notion of full national sovereignty regarding the choice of 
domestic instruments. Costs can be minimized only if Parties use the same mechanisms like the Protocol to 
meet their domestic targets, not GHG taxes or fixed-quantity standards (Hahn and Stavins, 1999).       
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Simultaneously, the flexible mechanisms can foster technology transfers or financial 
flows from industrial countries to developing and transitional economies. 
 
 
 
2. Flexible Mechanisms for Greenhouse Gasses Mitigation 
 
 
 According to the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to the national policies, that all of 
the parties are sovereign to design and to apply, three international market-based flexible 
mechanisms are created. These are: Joint Implementation (JI), Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Emissions Trading (ET). 
   
2.1. Joint Implementation 
 
Joint Implementation (KP 1997, Art.6) is designed to foster technology transfer 
and enhancement of carbon sinks. Annex I parties may transfer to, or acquire from any 
other Annex I Party, emission reduction units (ERU), or credits resulting from project 
activities that reduce emissions. The advantages of JI are: 
-   Investors are able to lower the costs of emission reductions. 
-   A significant potential for technology transfer exists in JI. 
-   JI involves investment in real projects, and creates real economic effects. 
-   JI can attract investments that otherwise would not occur in the certain countries. 
-  Owing to the additionality principle, JI has a potential to limit the use of surplus 
emission reductions, resulting from general economic slowdowns, like that happened in 
former communist countries (so called “hot air”). 
-  JI projects are more controllable by the host countries than CDM projects3. However, 
this advantage can become a disadvantage if host countries are incapable of developing 
proper control and monitoring mechanisms. If the control mechanisms and institutions 
are not in place, JI projects can produce bad socio-economic and environmental effects. 
For example, long-term projects can lock host countries into a situation where they are 
unable to fulfill their previous commitments, but still have to transfer credits to the other 
parties involved (Andrei, et. al. 2002). 
 The main principles regarding JI are: 1) additionality and 2) baseline preparation.   
The additionality principle means that all JI projects must be additional to the “business 
as usual” scenario (what would happen without the GHG mitigation project). The 
additionality is a complex principle covering environmental, financial, technical and legal 
aspects.  
The baseline preparation assumes that, in order to quantify emission reductions, 
all the parties involved must agree about the amount of emission that would occur 
without undertaking of the project. The difference between emission levels with and 
                                                 
3 JI projects are expected to be mostly intergovernmental activities, with the effects (ERU transfers) 
recognized and accepted from both sides. The parties involved have incentives and resources to control 
project quality and the emission transferes. CDM project are primarily oriented to non-governmental sector, 
incuding local communities and groups which gives a rationale for strict monitoring and evaluation 
procedures by conducted national and interational authorities.  
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without the JI project (emission savings) presents a basis for obtaining JI credits known 
as ERUs.  According to the Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol each county is allocated an 
assigned amount of GHGs that are allowed to be emitted during the 2008-2012 period. 
When a host country wants to transfer ERUs to an investor country, the ERU units are 
subtracted from the host’s assigned amount and added to the investor’s amount, with the 
purpose to avoid double counting of GHG reductions. If the transferred ERUs do not 
represent additional GHG reductions, a JI host county may encounter difficulties in 
meeting the Protocol obligations. Therefore it is in the host country’s interest to ensure: 1. 
real additionality of JI projects, 2. accurate estimation of baseline and 3. the appropriate 
amount of ERU transfers (Anderi et. al. 2002).  All the transactions must be entered into 
national and international registry systems required by the Protocol4.    
 
2.2 Clean Development Mechanism 
 
Clean Development Mechanism is aimed not only to allow Annex 1 parties to use 
emission reductions from non-Annex 1 countries, but to help developing countries to 
achieve sustainable development, via foreign investments (KP, 1997, Art.12). CDM 
projects, hosted by non-Annex 1 countries, are expected to earn certified emission 
reductions (CER), which industrialized countries may use to comply with Kyoto Protocol 
obligations. CDM projects have three overall criteria: 1. Projects must be voluntary 2. 
Projects must be able to show long-term climate change mitigation benefits and 3. 
Projects must contribute to emissions reductions above and beyond “business as usual” 
scenario, in other words projects must be additional (Rosales and Pronove, 2002). CDM 
projects are expected to generate financing primarily from private rather than from 
government sources, and will be implemented through non-profit, public and private 
partnerships, including participation of local communities and groups. The eligible 
sectors for CDM implementation are: energy, industrial processes, solvent and other 
product use, waste management, land-use and forestry. Investors from Annex 1 countries 
can receive credits from CDM projects if the country where they are legally recognized 
has: 
- Its commitment quota properly calculated and recorded; 
- A national accounting system of GHG in place; 
- Submitted a national greenhouse gas inventory; 
- Amounts in accordance with Kyoto Protocol communication requirements; 
(MA, 2001 : F31). 
CDM projects can take place in non-Annex 1 countries that will or have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, and that have strong institutional capacities for a regulatory and 
monitoring framework (Sokona and Nanasta, 2000)5. Among the required institutions the 
most important are: 1. National Authority (NA) which takes part in the validation process 
                                                 
4 The Kyoto Protocol requires that all Annex 1 countries have to develop national measuring and reporting 
systems, build national registries, provide timely reporting of the inventories and ultimately reach their 
targets during 2008-2012 period.   
5 Sokona and Nanasta (2000) suggest that “other basic capacities that seem indispensable include: an 
established business environment, an appropriate and well-linked administrative and institutional 
frameworks, an adequate and well-managed infrastructure, capable project developers and business 
managers, firm links between the private sector, government and NGOs, and development of accessible 
project information databases.”    
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and has the responsibility of certifying that the project contributes to the sustainable 
development goals of the host country, and 2. Designated Operational Entities (DOE) that 
carry out reporting and mediating functions6.  
According to the literature (Baumert, Kete and Figures, 2000) there are three 
different models of CDM application in practice: bilateral, multilateral and unilateral7. 
The scheme of a bilateral model is shown on Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Bilateral CDM model 
 
The bilateral CDM model involves the least new institutional capacity, because it 
is consistent with conventional foreign direct investment models. In the presented 
structure, the project selection, financing and credit sharing activities are worked out 
directly between interested parties on project-by-project basis. However, this may be the 
reason for quite a high level of transaction costs involved in identifying, preparation, 
financing and negotiating the project arrangements (Andrei et. al. 2002). 
A multilateral CDM model, presented in Figure 2, is characterized by a mutual 
CDM fund, which is organized by a number of Annex 1 investors. Such a model has 
several advantages. First, it minimizes the investors’ risks, spreading them through a 
group of portfolio holders (analogous to the stockholders’ mutual funds) and separating 
investors from project development and financing. Second, it gives an increased 
bargaining power to host countries. Instead of a direct dealing with Annex 1 entity, the 
host country may be negotiating with a fund manager, whose mandate is more compatible 
to the host’s national environmental interests (Andrei et. al. 2002). 
     
 
 
                                                 
6 The responsibilities of DOE are: to validate CDM project activities, to verify and certify emission 
reductions, to maintain a public list of CDM projects, to submit an annual report to Executive Board, and to 
make information about CDM projects publicly available (MA, 2001: E27)     
7 The idea of unilateral CDM projects, that are generating CERs without an Annex  1 investor, has been 
raised several times. However, at this moment, it is still unknown how the Executive Board will decide to 
proceed on the matter. The fact is that such CDM project model is not currently prohibited (Rosales and 
Pronove, 2002) and it may be very suitable for some of the non-Annex 1 transitional economies.   
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Figure 2. Multilateral CDM model   
 
In a unilateral CDM model there is no Annex 1 entity, so the whole project is 
developed and financed by the host country. Therefore the entire amount of credits 
belongs to the host entities, which are entitled to sell their credits on the international 
market.  However, host counties are faced with a full range of associated risks. The 
unilateral CDM projects, presented in Figure 3, need to have an independent third party 
approval of the project design, baseline calculations and the clamed emission reductions.    
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Figure 3. Unilateral CDM model     
 
Generally, the unilateral CDM model is attractive for countries with sufficient 
capacity and resources to select, finance and to operate sustainable development projects, 
but unable to attract enough bilateral or portfolio investments, because of unacceptably 
high country risks (Andrei et. al., 2002). Some of the transitional non-Annex 1 countries, 
especially West Balkans, are the exact case. However, lack of domestic capital, 
 
inadequate institutional setup, and low social credibility are the most serious obstacles to 
such CDM model. 
The difference between JI and CDM, related to the Annex I membership, may 
have significant consequences. In JI, any baseline calculation error has globally neutral 
effects, because it is automatically offset, since both countries are subject to emission 
reductions. However in the CDM  case, errors in baseline calculations may lead to higher 
global emissions than without the project, since non-Annex I countries have no initial 
emission limits.8 This gives a firm rationale for a strict international monitoring and 
verification of CDM projects(OECD, 1999).     
 
 
 
2.3. Emissions trading  
 
 
An international emission trading (ET) is a “cap and trade” system for Annex B 
Parties (KP, 1997 , Art. 3, Art. 17). The Kyoto Protocol enables any two of Annex B 
Parties, at any time, to exchange part of their emission commitment, consequently 
redistributing the allowed amount of emissions. Owing to the fact that all GHGs are 
perfectly mixing in the atmosphere, international emission trading has globally neutral 
environmental consequences, as long as global emission levels are same with and without 
trading.  
Different countries and regions have different degree of carbon-intensity, different 
productive efficiencies, and various elasticities of fuel substitution. That’s why countries 
and regions are experiencing various marginal abatement costs of GHG mitigation. The 
essence of emission trading lies in an opportunity that any entity with higher marginal 
abatement costs can pay, to an entity with lower costs, certain price for a previously 
agreed amount of emission reduction. Therefore, the overall economic effect is generally 
positive, with neutral environmental consequences. This mechanism may involve private 
companies that could trade between each other. The allowances traded are assigned 
amount units (AAUs) and removal units (RMUs) (KP, 1997 Art. 6, Art.17). 
Emissions trading may be very lucrative for Central and Eastern European 
counties that encountered transional recession, after 1990. Owing to the general economic 
contraction on the supply-side, most of the post-communist countries have obtained 
unintended emission savings, so called “hot air”. However, those “savings” do not stream 
from real environmental improvements, but from a general economic slowdown. By 
trading “hot air”, some reductions that would never have occurred, are being purchased, 
undermining the whole Kyoto Protocol structure. 
According to the recently published analysis (Pretel 2003), the estimated AAU9 
potential for trading in CEE amount the level of 1019 Mt of CO2eq per year (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
8 CDM baseline errors could also go the other way, leading to lower global emissions. However,  both sides 
have more incentive to exaggerate the impact of the project  by inflating baselines than unrealistically 
diminishing it’s initial level. (OECD, 1999)   
9 Assigned Amount Units (AAU) represent  the total amount of GHG that each Annex B country is allowed 
to emit during the first commitment period.  
 
 
Group of Parties estimated AAUs for transfer 
EITs in total 1019 
EU acceding countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia),  229 
EU candidates (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) 95 
others (Russian Federation, Ukraine) 695 
 
Table 1. Estimated AAUs surplus for EITs in Mt CO2eq/yr.   (Pretel, 2003) 
 
The estimated surplus is based on “with measures” scenario10, considered to be 
the best assessment for 2010 GHG emission outlook. For the EU acceding and candidate 
countries the AAU estimation is about 324 Mt CO2 eq annually (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Estimated AAU surpluses/gaps for EU acceding and candidates countries 
(Pretel, 2003) 
 
On the demand side, applying the same methodology, it has been estimated that 
the Annex II countries, which have already ratified the Kyoto Protocol, are expected to 
have annual AAU deficits of 525 Mt CO2 eq (Pretel, 2003). The yearly amount of  AAU 
gap in the EU member states is expected to be 193 Mt (Table 2)  
 
 
                                                 
10 The emission projections are expected to be made upon three scenarios: a) “without measures” , b) “with 
measures” c) and the lest probable “with additional measures”   
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Party estimated AAUs demand
Austria 18 
Belgium 32 
Denmark 2 
Finland 13 
France 50 
Germany -153 
Greece 4 
Italy 75 
Ireland 14 
Netherlands 26 
Portugal 20 
Spain 101 
Sweden -2 
United Kingdom -7 
 
Table 2.  Estimated AAUs demand for EU Member States without Luxemburg in 
Mt CO2 eq/yr (Pretel, 2003) 
 
According to the projection (Pretel 2003), AAU surpluses in the EU acceding and 
candidate countries are higher than the expected demand. Assuming that the potentially 
big international carbon-market players, USA and Russia, will stay out of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the only conclusion is that the AAU price will go down. This gives a rationale 
for the EU acceding and candidate countries to start emission trading operations as soon 
as possible (Pretel, 2003).         
 
 
3. Climate Protection Activities in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
3.1. Energy and Carbon Landscape in the Region  
 
The challenges of climate protection activities in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) are significant (Baumert et. al., 1999). There are several reasons for that. First, 
owing to the transitional recession, in all of the post-communist states, current GHG 
emissions are already far below 1990 levels (Table 3). This gives an opportunity for most 
of the CEE countries to reach the Kyoto targets without further difficulties and without a 
deeper macroeconomic contraction. Second, during 1980s and 1990s, all of the CEE 
countries experienced very high carbon intensities, much higher than in OECD (Figure 
5). The typically high carbon intensities indicate that a potential for low-cost emission 
opportunities exist in the region. Most of the energy equipment and facilities in the region 
are worn out, or technologically are out of date. In order to improve energy landscapes, 
most of the transitional economies need substantial investments. This creates a well-
known opportunity, so called “putty-clay technology”11. Third, the Kyoto Protocol offers 
                                                 
11 Most of the energy and environmental economists are aware of the phenomenon, called  “putty-clay 
technology”. The fact is that energy substitutability is much higher when choosing among industrial 
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special provisions for the countries in transition, giving them a certain degree of 
flexibility in the base year selection (Art. 3.4 and Art. 3.5)12.  Fourth, climate protection 
activities can bring environmental, economic and financial benefits, by fostering 
technology transfer, sustainable development and financial flows from the West. 
Upgrading technology, improving energy efficiency, raising human capital potential and 
improving air quality are the most obvious advantages of climate protection policies 
adopted in the region. 
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Figure 5.  CO2 emissions per unit of economic output in selected countries and 
OECD in 1980, 1989 and 1999 (Urge-Vorsatz, et.al. , 2002 ; Source: IEA 2002) 
 
It is not a surprise that some of the most developed and forward-moving CEE 
countries have adopted Annex 1 status, committing themselves to the significant GHG 
emission reductions by more than 5 % level (Table 3).         
 
COUNTRY       BASE YEAR      KP TARGET     BASE  EMISSION     1999  EMISSION    DIFFERENCE 
                                                                                       X                           Y                     (Y-X)/X 
 
Bulgaria         1988                 -8%              131,856             58,736            -55.45 
Czech Rep.    1990                 -8%              180,753           132,310            -26.8 
Estonia           1990                 -8%               42,470             19,301            -54.55 
Hungary         1985/7              -6%              97,628              75,228            -22.94         
Latvia             1990                 -8%              27,642              12,369            -55.25 
Lithuania        1990                 -8%              47,472              21,479            -54.75 
Poland            1988                 -6%             542,579           378,300            -30.28 
Romania         1989                 -8%             244,323         
                                                                                                                                                 
equipment at the time of an initial investment or major upgrade, than after the equipment is already in 
place. It is much more cost effective to introduce carbon saving technology in the course of the general 
reparation and rebuilding of energy systems, than as a part of equipment retrofit (Sachs, et. al. 1999).  
12 The calculated  carbon emission base levels in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are on average 
22% higher than real 1990 levels, owing to the mentioned flexibility, resulting in significantly easier 
reduction requirements (Baumert, 1990).  
 10
Slovakia         1990                  -8%              66,795              48,341           -27.63 
Slovenia         1990                  -8%              17,636 
 
 
Table 3. Annex  I  CEE countries, base emissions13, 1999 emissions14, and emission 
changes.  (Source: UNFCCC GHG database) 
 
 
Table 1 shows that in all of the analyzed countries, except Slovenia15, the 1999 
GHG emissions are approximately from 23% to 55% below the base level. The 
explanation for this can be found not only in the improved carbon efficiencies, but also in 
still existing high “hot air” levels.  
By the year 2000 only Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have achieved pre-
transitional GDP levels. The Czech Republic approached closely to the 1989 GDP level 
(Figure 6). This means that in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia there is 
no more “hot air”, and their further emission reductions can be traced only to the joint 
effect of reduced carbon intensity (Figure 8) and improved energy efficiency in the 
economy (Figure 7). However, all other CEE countries still may exploit the “hot air” 
potential.      
Although it may seem that in all of the analyzed countries the Kyoto Protocol 
target is a “low hanging fruit”, much remains to be done. There are still significant 
differences in the carbon intensity, between CEE and EU economies (Figures 9,10), and a 
high potential for improvements exists. According to the projections (Baumert et. al.,  
1999) most of the CEE countries are expected to experience a sustained period of 
economic growth and “hot air” will soon disappear. For example, Bulgaria, under a 
“business as usual” scenario, is expected to surpass the base year carbon emission levels 
by 2005, but under a GHG mitigation scenario Bulgarian emissions are projected to 
remain below the base level through at least 201516. A similar situation is in Slovakia 
where, according to several projection scenarios, the 1990 emission level is expected to 
be reached before 2010. The most important sectors that will contribute to the future 
emission increases are transportation and tourism, processing industry and, to some 
extent, energy production. The only sustainable solution for all of the CEE countries is to 
achieve the Kyoto Protocol targets by diminishing carbon intensity. A review of carbon 
intensity data indicates that forward-moving reformist countries have already brought 
their energy intensities significantly down (Figure 7).    
 
 
 
                                                 
13 CO2  CH4  HFCs  PFCs and  SF6 total emissions in Gg of CO2 equivalent.   Source: UNFCCC      
http://ghg.unfccc.int/default1.htf 
14 1999 data for Romania and Slovenia are not available. 
15 Owing to the very low GHG emission base levels, Slovenia is expected to be the only CEE country that 
may have problems with the Kyoto Protocol commitments. (Maly, et.al. 1999). 
16 Bulgaria, 1996.  
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Figure 6. GDP of  Annex I CEE  countries (1989=100%) (Source: IEA, 2003) 
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Figure 7: The development of energy intensities in CEE countries, 1989 –2001 
(Source: IEA,  2003) 
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Figure 8. Carbon intensities (CO2/primary energy) in selected CEE economies and 
EU.  (Source: IEA 2003) 
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Figure 9. Carbon intensities (CO2/GDP) in selected CEE economies and EU. 
(Source: IEA, 2003) 
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Figure 10. Carbon intensities (CO2/GDP ppp) in selected CEE economies and EU. 
(Source: IEA, 2003) 
 
 
3.2 Carbon Saving Activities in the Region  
 
The most important carbon saving activities and policies are connected with the 
energy sector reforms. Restructuring of the energy sectors in CEE is one of the most 
sensitive and complex transitional issues. Decentralization of energy production, 
transmission and distribution, breaking up of state monopolies, commercialization of  
non-core activities, and market liberalization are on the top of the reform agendas in all of 
the fast-moving economies (Ürge-Vorsatz et.al.2002). A complementary strategy to it is 
price liberalization. A combination of regulated price increases, plus elimination of 
subsidies, adjusting energy prices to approximate full-cost levels are essential for the 
energy efficiencies.  In Poland and Hungary prices have already been raised close to the 
EU level, while subsides have successfully been cut off. In other CEE countries energy 
price reforms are still to be completed.  
Privatization of energy sector is another key element of the restructuring process. 
Limited privatization has occurred in Hungary17, Poland18, Czech Republic19. It is 
                                                 
17 In Hungary the privatization of electricity sector has been practically finished. All of the electricity 
distribution companies, and all but one generating plants (Paks) have been sold to the foreign strategic 
investors who acquired majority stakes in  key utilities. Electricity transmission grid remains public (MVM 
2002). Hungarian Oil Company (MOL) was also privatized in 1996. 
18 The Polish government is in a process of selling shares in the 55 electric power companies and in 33 
distribution companies to the foreign strategic investors. French (EDF and GDF),  Swedish (Vattenfall),  
Belgian (Tractabel) and Spanish (Iberdola) companies are the most active players (Maly et.al. , 2002).     
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underway in Bulgaria20, and is in an initial stage in Romania. In most of the transitional 
economies privatization is seen a revenue raising activity, but also as technology and 
management transfer stimulus. In the Hungarian energy sector it created some positive 
environmental effects (MVM, 2001). 
Liberalization and market opening are essential for a successful energy sector 
transformation. Empirical evidence from more that a hundred cases all over the world 
(Pollit, 1995) suggests that the price liberalization and competition, induced by 
dismantling of monopolies, are more important than privatization, in providing incentives 
for efficiency improvement and emission reductions (Baumert, et.al. , 1999). However, 
there is, also, clear evidence from the Ukrainian electricity sector reforms, during 1990s, 
that there is no successful transformation without privatization, or without at least 
alteration of ownership structure (Pesic and Ürge-Vosatz, 2001). In CEE the highest level 
of energy sector liberalization has been achieved in Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic. In the mentioned countries independent Energy Regulatory Offices have been 
set up, and the domestic electricity and gas markets have been partially opened for a 
competition. It is worth mentioning that an open energy market has been successfully 
institutionalized in Poland (Gielda energii).   
Most of the CEE countries have undertaken complex multi-sectoral policies, 
targeted to increase energy efficiency.  Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia 
have prepared National GHG mitigation strategies that were included in the National 
communications to the UNFCCC. A similar document is in a course of preparations in 
Poland.  
National climate change policies include a broad range of fiscal instruments 
(carbon taxes, energy fuel taxes, electricity taxes, renewables subsides), technical 
standards (energy labeling and building codes), transportation policies and agricultural 
policies. Information and awareness programs on energy efficiency are applied in all of 
the Annex 1 countries in the region. Special attentions deserve “Hungarian Energy Policy 
Principles” of July 1999, “The Action Program” of October 1999 and “Hungarian Energy 
Saving Program” with its 11 national sub-projects.  
The Czech government, in January 2000, approved “The National Energy Policy” 
which created founding for “The Energy Management Act” adopted by the Parliament in 
October 2000. “The State Program to Support Energy Savings and use of Renewable 
Sources of Energy”, a one-year program, set up regularly since 1991, by the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, is also worth mentioning. The most successful tool in the Czech 
climate protection policy was Clean Air Act, that came into force on January 1, 2002. 
Although the Act was aimed to target all of the air-polluting gasses, not only CO2, it’s 
positive impact on climate protection is undeniable (Pretel 2004). The Czech Government 
on March 3, 2004  set itself the target of cutting CO2 emissions per capita by at least 30 
per cent between 2000 and 2020. The target forms part of a new climate change program, 
adopted on March 3, 2004 which will help to form the National Allocation Plan.  
                                                                                                                                                 
19 In the Czech Republic, the 67% state owned generating company, CEZ is a dominant electric power 
utility. Independent power producers cover about 30% of the total electricity supply.  Among them are U.S. 
, French and UK companies (Maly et.al. , 2002).  Transmission and distribution remain mostly under the 
governments’ control.  
20 In Bulgaria, the first phase of privatization in the energy sector has begun with the planned sale of 22 
small hydro plants, with a total capacity of 226 MW. Another 41 hydro plants with a total capacity of 148 
MW will follow this sale (Maly et. al. , 2002)  
 15
In Poland two non-governmental organizations, Institute for Sustainable 
Development and Foundation for Energy Efficiency, undertook a number of activities 
closely related to the climate protection.  One of the most successful was the competition, 
during 2000, for a financial support of the investment projects in field of GHG 
reductions, on a municipal level (Maly et.al. 2002).  In Slovakia one of the most active 
organizations in public awareness rising is the Slovak Energy Agency. In Slovenia the 
similar task has been fulfilled by the Agency for Efficient Use of Energy. 
In Bulgaria the Municipal Energy Efficiency Network, involving 23 
municipalities, was set up in 1997, with the help of US AID. Later on, the Network has 
been financed by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the UNDP project on 
“Energy Efficiency Strategy to Mitigate GHG emissions” (Maly et.al., 2002). In Latvia 
several information actions and environmental-friendly campaigns were implemented 
with the international support. In Lithuania, two Energy Efficiency Centers, parts of the 
Lithuanian Energy Institute, were established in 1993, with the aims of gathering 
information, disseminating knowledge, participating in implementation activities of the 
National Program and popularization of new technologies.    
In all of the analyzed countries fiscal instruments are represented by the value 
added tax (VAT) on energy fuels.  Tax rates vary from 10% on natural gas, biogas, and 
district heating in Slovakia to 25% on all liquid fuels in Hungary. Besides VAT, the 
excise tax on liquid fuels has been levied in most of the countries, by a proportional 
amount per 1000 liter.  
Slovenia is the only CEE country that has implemented carbon tax. The tax came 
into force on January 1997 and is linked to carbon content of the fuel. The initial tax rate 
was approximately 5.5 € per ton of carbon dioxide. In March 1998 the rate was increased 
to 16 € per ton of carbon dioxide. Currently the tax has been levied only on liquid fuels, 
but it is intended, from 2004, to tax coal for electricity production too. Energy tax 
structure in Slovenia is shown on Table 4. 
 
Tax objective             Excise tax rate        VAT rate    CO2 tax component 
Unleaded petrol   368 EUR/kl  19%  31.8 EUR/kl 
Leaded petrol    388 EUR/kl  19%  31.8 EUR/kl 
Diesel     289 EUR/kl  19%  37.6 EUR/kl 
Light fuel oil    24.1 EUR/kl  19%  37.6 EUR/kl 
Heavy fuel oil    14.5 EUR/t  19%  44.8 EUR/t 
LPG     155.2 EUR/t 
    
Table 4. Energy  tax structure in Slovenia (Maly, et.al. 2002) 
 
There is no earmarking of tax revenues in Slovenia. The aim of the carbon 
component is to provide the incentive for emission reductions (Maly, et.al. 2002). 
In Hungary the excise tax on petrol and diesel includes a 3% product charge, 
earmarked for environmental purposes. The rest of revenues from Excise tax and VAT go 
to the central budget. There is additional environmental charge, in amount of 16 € per 
ton, imposed on heating oil with sulfur content with more than 2.8% sulfur, and on 
heating oils that do not comply with the Hungarian standards, in amount of 290 € per ton. 
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The revenues go to the central budget, but are predestinated for environmental purposes. 
Natural gas, electricity and district heating are subject to 12% VAT  (Maly, et.al. 2002). 
 In Poland, besides excise tax on liquid fuels, and 22% VAT (on liquid fuels, coal, 
natural gas, electricity and district heating) a carbon dioxide emission charge has been 
introduced in amount of 0.045 €/t . The revenue goes to the environmental funds. (Maly, 
et.al. 2002). 
 A high similarity between energy tax systems in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic is caused by the EU accession status of the mentioned countries. The only 
difference is that, in the Czech Republic, some products related to energy conservation 
and renewables are subjects of a reduced 5% VAT rate21.  
In Bulgaria, the 1999 Energy Act has opened the door for approximation of the 
national legislation to the EU directives. The Act aims to introduce market instruments in 
the energy sector and to promote energy efficient technologies. The import of many 
energy efficiency related inputs and products in Bulgaria is tax-free. Energy tax structure 
in Bulgaria is shown on Table 5.     
 
Tax object   Excise tax rate  VAT rate Fuel product charge 
Unleaded petrol       113 – 189 EUR/kl                20%  9 EUR/kl 
Leaded petrol        112 - 207 EUR/kl                20%    14 – 18 EUR/kl 
Diesel                    48 EUR/kl     20%  6 EUR/kl 
LPG (as propellant)                165 EUR/t     20% 
Kerosene                 165 EUR/t 
Boiler fuel, mazut (sulphur content over 1%)              11 EUR/t 
Industry gasoline                    7 EUR/t 
Natural gas                                                                     20% 
Electricity                                                                       20% 
District heating                                                               20%    
Coal                                                                                20% 
 
Table 5. Energy tax structure in  Bulgaria (Maly et. al. 2002). 
 
 
The revenue from fuel charges goes to the National Environmental Fund and is 
used for air protection projects, while excise taxes and VAT are designated to the central 
budget (Maly et. al., 2002). 
In spite of the differences in impact of transportation upon the regional level of 
emissions, in all of the analyzed countries transportation policies are broadly adopted. In 
                                                 
21 Energy subsidies create a very specific problem in the Czech Republic. The form of energy subsidization 
had various forms. Driving reasons were social  (protect households from massive increase of prices of 
energy products), and resulted in a very price-deformed structure of the energy-product market. Prices still  
do not reflect negative external effects on environment (which results in a situation when the most polluting 
energy forms are unfortunately usually the cheapest ones, thus creating no incentive for using more 
environmentally friendly means of energy). On a contrary, renewable energies are valued on real prices, 
which make them less competitive and thus harder to penetrate the energy market (Maly, et.al. 2002). 
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the focus of transportation policies is a set of measures aimed to minimize energy 
consumption and carbon emissions22.  
Comparison of the regional technical-standard policies shows many similarities in 
the applied instruments (energy labeling, building codes, minimum efficiency standards). 
Countries closer to the EU accession are more advanced in technical-standards 
application, like in many other climate protection issues (Reiche, 2003). 
 
However, not all of the CEE countries show the same pattern of development. In 
spite of the fact that majority of the CEE economies share a common recent past, 
significant differences in the pattern and pace of reforms can be seen in the region. All of 
the countries that have not ratified Kyoto Protocol are slow-reformers. Among them are 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Moldavia and Serbia and 
Montenegro. A common characteristic of this group (Figure 10) are higher, and in some 
cases increasing carbon intensities, compared to the levels in CEE countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto protocol. 
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Figure 11. Carbon intensities of energy sectors in the non-Kyoto Protocol CEE 
economies  (Source: IEA, 2002) 
                                                 
22 For example in Poland the Draft National Transport Policy, for the period of 2000-2015, provides for: 
1.Development of transport needs (rationalization of demand for cargo transport and individual mobility of 
the public) as well as promotion of passenger collective transport, bicycle and pedestrian transport; 
2.Establishing the mechanisms in favor of the performance of passenger and cargo transport  (including 
promotion of transportation means using reduced pollutant emission); 
3.Introduction of economic and fiscal instruments focused on sustainable development (road charges, 
differentiated fuel prices and other fees proportionally to the level of pollutant emission and fuel 
consumption, etc.); 
4.Elimination of the transportation means which do not conform to the environmental standards; 
5.Establishing the conditions for alternative fuels to be introduced; 
6.Establishing mechanisms to support the use of „cleaner“ transport (railway, shipping); 
7.Promotion of combined transport (Maly, et.al. 2002).  
 
 
 
 18
 
It is also worth pointing out that the mentioned countries show no, or very little 
interest in climate protection. There is a common position in all of the slow-reforming 
economies that climate change issues are not on the top of the agenda. Assuming that 
some of the mentioned countries, during the recent, past have experienced serious 
political troubles and wars, it becomes obvious that other social and economic problems 
are their priorities. However, a potential for solving some of the problems via efficiency 
and carbon-intensity improvements is absolutely neglected, or unknown in the region. 
Regional potentials for CDM investments are still to be explored. Benefits of  “no regret” 
policies, and the other structural changes in energy and transportation sectors, still have to 
be publicly disseminated. It means that in the mentioned countries an effort has to be 
made in education of decision makers. Broadly spread ignorance, and a general mistrust 
in the Kyoto Protocol are serious obstacles to the climate protection activities in the 
analyzed countries (Carlson, 2003). In spite of the fact that high carbon intensities 
(Figures 11, 12) offer a remarkable potential for foreign investments, nothing will happen 
without the previous education and public awareness rising about climate protection 
opportunities. 
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Figure 12. Carbon intensities in the non-Kyoto Protocol CEE economies  (Source: 
IEA, 2002. 
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Figure 13. Carbon intensities in the non-Kyoto Protocol CEE economies at 
purchasing power parity. (Source:IEA 2003) 
 
 
4. Climate Protection Opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
One of the advantages of transitional economies lies in an opportunity to include 
climate protection standards and sustainable development patterns in the restructuring 
processes. Structural and institutional changes aimed to create market economy, may also 
have carbon saving and energy efficiency improving effects. High environmental 
standards are not always linked with rich and prosperous economies. Environment 
protection policies included in the early stage of transition may be cost-effective in the 
long run. It is more cost-effective to introduce high environmental standards in the early 
phase of transition than to cope with the pollution later. That is the case with so called 
“no regret” policies that produce “double dividend” effects23.  
Identification, elaboration and implementation of the “double dividend” climate 
protection polices open a broad field of opportunities for CEE countries. National 
Climate Change Action Plans have been completed in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary. The Plans identify and prioritize measures that will help countries 
to meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments. Besides the description of potential GHG 
reduction policies, cost estimation analysis have been made as a part of the Plans. In spite 
                                                 
23 “Double dividend” can be explained as: 1) positive externalities linked with economies of scale or 
economies of scope that simultaneously produce environmental benefits and  2) positive economic effects 
obtained from environmental policies.     
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of the fact that estimated costs of various policies differ from one country to another, the 
envisaged measures are similar (Table 6). 
 
County  Opportunities for Cost effective GHG emission reduction 
measures  
Bulgaria24 Gas supply to households, commercial and administrative 
buildings 
Demand side measures in industry and households 
Reduction of thermal and electric losses 
Hydro potential projects  
Czech Republic25 District hearting and CHP 
Hydro potential projects 
Biomass utilization in public and private sector 
Wind, solar and geothermal energy use  
Collection and use of landfill methane   
Hungary26 Communal district heating and CHP 
Installation of better-insulated windows 
Installation of low-flow faucets and shower heads 
Active solar water heating systems in the household sector 
Installation of compact fluorescent lights 
Poland27   Improving heat insulation in the residential sector 
Rationalization of heat and energy use 
Landfill gas collection and use 
Wind solar and geothermal energy use 
Agricultural biogas use 
Wood and straw fired boilers  
Small hydro-power plants 
Romania28 District heating modernization 
Improving heat insulation 
Hydro energy use 
Slovakia29 Biomass use in district heating and industry 
Geothermal and solar energy use 
Introduction of combined circle in CHP and industry  
Slovenia30 CHP and district heating  
Biomass use 
Hydro power use 
Waste management improvements 
Demand side measures in industry and buildings  
Table 6. Opportunities for the cost-effective GHG emission reduction measures in 
some of the Annex 1 CEE countries 
                                                 
24 Source: Maly, M. et. al (2002) 
25 Source: Maly, M. et. al (2002) 
 
26 Source: Zilahy, G. et. al. (2000) 
27 Source: Wisniewski, G. ed. (2000) 
28 Source: Maly, M. et. al (2002) 
29 Source: Maly, M. et. al (2002) 
30Source:  Maly, M. et. al (2002) 
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Most of the analyzed CEE countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, as 
UNFCCC Annex 1 parties, have been involved in Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). 
AIJ program was initiated in 1995 as the pilot phase for Joint Implementation (KP Art. 
6). Like the Joint Implementation, AIJ projects were aimed to reduce GHG emissions and 
sequester carbon. However, no credits have been  obtained from the AIJ projects.  
Most of the AIJ projects in CEE are concentrated in three Baltic States. Just 20 
AIJ projects are located in other analyzed countries (Table 5). All of  AIJ projects applied 
in the region are oriented to promote and to develop cost-effective GHG reductions 
mentioned in Table 4. Sectoral structure of the implemented AIJ projects is shown in 
Table 6.    
 Experiences gathered from AIJ projects are expected to help CEE countries to 
identify legal barriers and institutional defects that may deter Joint Implementation 
Projects. The lack of institutional capacity and a shortage of human and financial 
resources, create potential hurdles (Baumert, et.al. 1999). In order to prepare ground for 
JI projects and to cope with the potential difficulties, several CEE countries have 
established National JI Offices. Among those countries are: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In most cases JI offices are closely connected 
to the Ministries of Environment.  
The lack of experience with market-based instruments, jointly with policy inertia 
and historical preference for command and control measures may create obstacles for the 
Flexible Mechanism Implementation. An unclear definition of property rights, strong 
government interference in regulatory activities, market distortions and still existing 
energy price-subsidies in some of the CEE countries are expected to create additional 
problems in Flexible Mechanisms implementation.  However, “it should be noted that the 
mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol are beyond the scope and complexity of any 
environmental regulatory policy ever implemented, even in advanced market economies.” 
(Baumert, et al. , 1999). 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
Host country Number  of 
projects 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech R.  
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak R. 
1 
1 
4 
21 
4 
25 
9 
3 
4 
4 
Total: 76 
AIJ Projects by type Number of 
projects 
Energy efficiency 
Forest preservation 
Fuel switching 
Fugitive gas capture 
Renewable energy 
38 
 1 
 8 
 1 
28 
Total 76 
 Table 7. Distribution of AIJ Projects         Table 8. Sectoral structure of AIJ                                          
                                                 (Source: UNFCCC-cc:info , 2003) 
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5. Climate Protection in Serbia and Montenegro 
 
5.1. Climate Protection landscape in Serbia and Montenegro 
 
 The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia)31 is situated on the area of 
102,173 square kilometers32 with the population of 8,502,620 inhabitants33. Economic 
activity in Serbia and Montenegro is in a process of recovery after a period of sharp 
decline during 1990s, one of the world highest hyperinflations in 1993, and enormous 
war damage during NATO campaign in 1999 (Table 9, Figure 14). 
 
 
 
Total GDP in current 
US $ million 
 
Per capita GDP in 
current US $ 
 
1990 
1995 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
28390 
15285 
16419 
15487 
10090 
  8670 
2696 
1449 
1549 
1459 
1205 
1035 
 
Table 9. Gross Domestic Product of FR Yugoslavia 34(Source: SYY 2002). 
 
  
 
Figure 14 . GDP of Serbia 1987-1999 (index 1987=100) (Source: G17,  2000)  
                                                 
31 Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By adopting of 
the Constitutional charter, parliaments of both states agreed on creating of a new country, a union of two 
sovereign states, former Yugoslav federal republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The legal framework for the 
new country is still under construction. 
32 The territory without Kosovo and Metohija is 91,286 square kilometers. 
33 Source: SYY 2002. 
34 Conversion according to the World Bank method by market exchange rates.  
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At the end of 1980s Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia) was one of the 
biggest energy producers and consumers in the in the region. During the period of 
economic decline, contraction in the energy sector was below the average of economy as 
a whole (Figure 15). However, energy intensity in FR Yugoslavia, especially during 
1990s, was quite high, much higher than in EU or OECD countries, even higher than in 
Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic (Figure16). 
In 1999, during NATO campaign, Serbian energy infrastructure was exposed to a 
high damage. The amount of direct damage inflicted on the Serbian electro-transmission 
grid has been estimated to 270 million US $, on the oil and gas industry above 600 
million US $, and on the district heating facilities about 5.3 million US $ (Dinkic, 1999).    
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Figure 15.   Total primary energy supply in FR Yugoslavia 1992-2001 (Source: IEA, 
2003) 
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Figure 16. Energy Intensity in some of the transitional countries and FR Yugoslavia. 
(Source: IEA, 2003) 
 
 Carbon intensity of economy in FR Yugoslavia is higher than in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia or Romania, but is lower than in Poland and Czech Republic (Figures 
8, 11, 17). Measured by carbon dioxide emissions per amount of GDP, carbon intensity in 
Yugoslavia is above the regional average (Figures 9, 10,12, 13, 18 and 19). 
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Figure 17. Carbon Intensity Development of the Yugoslav Economy 1992-2001. 
(Source: IEA, 2003) 
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Figure 18. Development of Carbon Intensity in FR Yugoslavia 1992-2001 
(CO2/GDP in 1995 US $ exch. rate). (Source: IEA, 2003)  
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Figure 19. Development of Carbon Intensity in FR Yugoslavia 1992-2000 
(CO2/GDP in 1995 US $ ppp). (Source: IEA, 2003)  
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In spite of the fact that Yugoslav carbon intensities are above the CEE average,  
nothing has been done in the field of climate protection. In June 1997, F.R. Yugoslavia 
has ratified UNFCCC, and that was the only legal act linked with climate change. In June 
2002, the Serbian government established Ministry for Protection of Natural Resources 
and Environment. Initiating the first comprehensive environmental analysis and preparing 
Framework National Strategies for certain areas, the Ministry created a turning point in 
environmental policy. Among many other pioneering activities, the Serbian Ministry, 
with the help of GEF, set up a project aimed to enable Serbia and Montenegro to prepare 
the First National Communication to the UNFCCC.  However, by now, the project has 
not been completed.       
 There is no official GHG inventory for Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia). 
The only official data about carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion can be found 
in the International Energy Agency database (Figure 19).  
 
 
 
FR Yugoslavia Total CO2 emissions from 
fuel combustion (Sectoral approach)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
M
t
 
 
 
Figure 20. FR Yugoslavia Total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. (Source: IEA, 
2003) 
 
However during late nineties an attempt was made by a group of experts from the 
Federal Hydro-meteorological Institute in Belgrade to estimate total amount of GHG 
emissions and sinks from various sources (Dacic, 2003). Although their findings present 
unofficial and preliminary results from an initial study (Figure 21), a much more precise 
image of greenhouse gas emissions is given than in IEA database (Figure 20). From the 
sectoral structure of GHG emissions (Table 10) it can clearly be seen that energy sector 
was the main source of GHG emissions in FR Yugoslavia. Rationale for a low impact of 
the industrial sector and a high impact of agriculture on the total level of GHG emissions 
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lies in a fact that industrial production was badly affected by the economic crisis, during 
1990s, and the decline in agriculture was much lower than in other sectors. 
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Figure 21. Total GHG Net Emissions in FR Yugoslavia 1990-1998. (Source: Dacic, 
2003) 
 
 
 Energy Industrial 
Processes 
Agriculture Land-use 
Change and 
Forestry 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
74.0 
70.7 
68.8 
67.6 
65.6 
66.9 
67.5 
66.8 
64.3 
9.0 
6.2 
5.2 
1.9 
3.0 
2.6 
4.8 
9.1 
     11.4 
23.0 
23.8 
28.4 
33.0 
35.4 
32.5 
29.5 
26.4 
26.5 
-5.5 
-2.3 
-4.7 
-6.1 
-8.2 
-5.0 
-4.5 
-4.8 
-4.7 
 
Table 10. Sectoral structure of GHG emissions in FR Yugoslavia, 1990-1998 (% of 
total emissions)35. (Source: Dacic, 2003) 
 
According to the Table 10, it is obvious that climate protection policy in Serbia 
and Montenegro should be focused on energy sector, which accounts for more than 10% 
of GDP. A set of demand-side measures is to be implemented with an aim to increase 
energy efficiency in economy. First of all, electricity sector, as the main energy producer, 
                                                 
35 The table is based on unofficial preliminary data from the initial GHG inventories study for FR 
Yugoslavia.  
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but also as the main source of GHG emissions, should be entirely restructured in the 
course of economic transition. After the years of total negligence and disinvestments, the 
Serbian electricity sector offers a broad field of opportunities for technical and economic 
efficiency improvements36. During the nineties, the electricity demand shifted gradually 
to the household and tertiary sector. The household sector share in the electricity 
consumption has increased from 42% in 1990 to almost 58% in 2000, while the industry 
sector share has dropped from 51% in 1990 to 31.1% in 2000. The main reason for that 
can be found in heavily subsidized electricity prices, and in a switch from the other 
energy sources to electricity for the residential space heating.  
The industrial share in the final energy consumption in Serbia, during the nineties 
dropped from about 46% in 1990 to 36% in 1998. At the same time the industrial product 
share dropped from 41% of the total GDP, in 1990, to 38% in 1998.  Iron and steel 
metallurgy, basic chemical production, and construction materials industry create 
approximately 50% of the total industrial energy consumption, although the GDP share 
form those sectors is still bellow 15%. Combined heat and power production in industry 
is only 6.6% and the capacity of the units is from 0.3 to 25 MWe with the average age of 
27 years. 
  A similar set of problems can be found in the district-heating sector. Only 16% 
of 2.65 million of households in Serbia are connected to district heating systems, and 9% 
depend on autonomous heat sources, using mainly fossil fuels. The efficiency of 
centralized heat production and distribution in Serbia is lower than 55%  (Haga et. al, 
2002) which offers an opportunity for the great improvement37. However, a realization of 
this potential remains difficult because of poor economic situation in the sector. All 
district heating companies in Serbia are in a bed financial situation mostly due to the 
inadequate tariff levels which, at the moment (0.08-0.11 US $ monthly, per square meter 
of heated space), do not cover even fuel costs (Haga et. al, 2002).  
The transportation sector share of the total final energy consumption in Serbia is 
about 30%, and is expected to grow rapidly in the years to come. Like in all other Central 
and Eastern European countries an upward trend in individual traffic is evident. The 
growth rate is considered to be about 20% annually. Insufficient capacity of railways and 
low opportunities for water transport of goods, makes the overall energy landscape even 
worse.  
The fact is that electricity production in Serbia and Montenegro is, and in the next 
decades will remain being, oriented mostly on the domestic low-quality coal38. The 
increased productive efficiency, achieved by technical improvements, would have 
                                                 
36 According to the conclusions of the Third Yugoslav Symposium on the Electricity Distribution, held in 
Vrnjacka banja, in October 2002, the amount of electricity theft in Serbia was about 1 billion KWh , or 
about 30-40 million US $ . According to Mr. Sloboadan Kujovic, from the Electricity Supply Company of 
Serbia (EPS), technical losses in the electricity distribution, in 2001, in Serbia amounted  more than 4 
billion KWh, or 15.48% of the total electricity consumption. (“Politika”, daily news October 19, 2002, p 
A13.)       
37 The average district heating plant in Serbia is 20 years old, with low or zero maintenance during nineties.  
The application of modern technologies and rehabilitation is expected to increase heat production 
efficiency in Serbia by at least 20%  (Haga et. Al,. , 2002). 
38 Electricity production in  Serbia during 1990s was based on the following input structure: 62.09% coal 
fired thermal production , 4.24% gas and oil thermal production, 33.67% hydro production (SSY, 2002) 
Except for medium and large sized hydropower, no renewable energy sources are significantly being used.    
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positive effects on carbon intensity. Technical improvements in the energy sector are 
necessary, but not sufficient precondition for a successful carbon protection policy. 
Economic policies aimed to improve energy efficiency, including price liberalization and 
cutting of subsidies, are also essential but not all-inclusive. For a successful climate 
protection policy a set of carbon minimization measures and instruments is to be 
implemented.     
 
 
 
5.2. Climate protection policy framework 
 
Climate protection framework for Serbia and Montenegro should be based on 
policy option analysis. We have defined four most probable options, connected with 
various domestic and international political and environmental scenarios. 
  [A] First option is to absolutely neglect climate protection issues until 2010. The 
rationale behind such an option can be found in the following:  
a) According to the previously mentioned Serbia and Montenegro (FR 
Yugoslavia) do not produce globally significant GHG emissions. b) During nineties, 
Serbia and Montenegro were exposed to an unprecedented economic contraction, 
hyperinflation and war damage. That is why many other socio-economic problems are on 
the top of policy agenda. Climate protection issues are to be tackled after a period of 
rapid economic growth and social stabilization that will take place in the years to come. 
A country with more than a million of refugees and internally displaced population has 
much severe social problems that climate protection. c) The main international players 
and the most significant GHG emitters, like USA, Russia, and China are still out of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
However, in spite of the reasons to carry on with “business as usual scenario” 
there is a set of counterarguments.  
a) The Union of Serbia and Montenegro has an aspiration to become a EU 
member. In all of the EU countries climate protection policy is considered as one of the 
priorities. By ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, and accepting Annex 1 status, all of the 
current EU members and the accession countries have accepted an important set of 
international obligations39. This means that the Union of Serbia and Montenegro will be 
obliged to join the Kyoto Protocol and Annex 1, before the accession. b) Although it is 
hard to estimate in pecuniary terms the exact amount of potential loses caused by the 
climate protection ignoring, it is clear that without joining the Kyoto Protocol Serbia and 
Montenegro will be excluded from the European integration processes. c) The so-called 
argument  “first development and than environment“ may be used as a powerful toll in 
obtaining public support for a “status quo” in all socio-economic issues. The fact that 
economic growth has priority in nearly all of the European countries does not give a 
                                                 
39 Under the “Burden Sharing Agreement” adopted  on  April 25, 2002 (Decision 2002/385/EC) all 15  EU 
member sates commited themselves to reduce GHG emissions by 8% below 1990 levels during the first 
period from 2008 to 2012. By Decision 2004/280/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (entered 
into force on March 10, 2004)  all the requirements under the Kyoto Protocol became  legally binding  in 
all Member States. The Decision realates in particular to the way in which emissions have to be monitored, 
accounted  and reported. With this step all provisions of the Kyoto Protocol have become EU law. (EU 
2004)  
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justification for environmental hostile pattern of development. On a contrary, in the 
modern economics so-called “putty clay technology” argument favors an economic 
growth balanced with environmental objectives (Sachs et al. 1999).  The “putty clay 
technology” argument, by stressing the importance of right environmental choices at the 
beginning of investment cycles, gives a theoretical explanation for policy action. By 
spending more on initial physical capital in the energy and the other environment-
damaging sectors, efficiency gains and input savings are enabled during the later stages 
of the investment life cycles.    
  [B] Another policy option can be described as an attempt to introduce climate 
protection tools but without ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  
This option can be accounted for by the fact that the most important carbon 
dioxide emitters in the world have not ratified the Protocol yet. It is also based on a 
scenario of postponed integration of Serbia and Montenegro in the EU. Although not 
favorable, this scenario is possible, so it requires an adequate response. In the climate 
protection issues the adequate response will be not to wait for the EU accession, but to act 
proactively and to adopt international carbon-saving and energy-efficiency standards 
before the accession deadline, simultaneously trying not to imperil the international 
competitiveness of Serbian and Montenegrin economy. Economic background for such 
policy can be found not only in the “putty clay” argument, but also in the need for 
increasing the overall efficiency of input use in the course of transition.   
In the mentioned option climate protection policy will be mostly oriented on 
voluntary agreements and “win-win” solutions. Input control in agriculture, technology 
standards in industry, emission control for motor vehicles in transportation sector, energy 
efficiency standards in buildings, control of landfill gasses etc. can be chosen among the 
broad range of command and control policy tools (CEF Consultants, 1994). 
A set of policy tools, so called economic instruments, has not been broadly 
implemented in the environmental policy of Serbia and Montenegro yet.  In order to 
protect international competitiveness of the domestic economy, carbon taxes and 
emission charges are not expected to be introduced. However, tax incentives, soft loans 
and credit guarantees will be very welcomed. Instead of subsidies, complicated to 
administer and expensive to monitor, we strongly recommend creation of a revolving 
soft-loan fund for energy efficiency retrofits and renewable sources promotion. 
Government grants for research, development and demonstration projects will also have a 
role in the climate protection policy mix.  
In order to assess various policies in Serbian conditions, we analyzed potential for 
implementation and applicability of the certain carbon saving tools and instruments. 
According to experts’ opinions, we have graded policy tools from the most applicable (A 
rate) to the least applicable (E rate). Valuation criteria included administration and 
monitoring costs, efficiency, and effectiveness of the tools, which are grouped in three 
categories (Table 11).  
From the analysis it becomes obvious that there is a growing need for public 
awareness and information campaigns. Policy tools aimed to raise public awareness and 
to disseminate information about carbon-saving potential will be envisaged (positive 
disclosure advertising, energy audits, environmental labeling, local community 
information about metering and invoicing, and public education about demand side 
management, etc). 
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      Costs Tools 
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     C 
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Energy 
Industry 
 
Energy, 
transportation 
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Energy, ind.,  
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TOOLS 
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disclosure 
Advertising 
 
Energy audits 
 
Environmental 
labeling 
 
Local comm. 
Information 
 
Professional 
education and 
training 
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  B 
 
  A 
 
 
 
  C 
 
 
  C 
 A 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 A 
 
 
 
  A 
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    A       
      B 
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Residential, 
Industry 
Commerce 
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Public adm. 
Commerce 
Residential s. 
 
Residential s. 
 
 
Industry, 
Energy 
 
Table 11. Applicability of Carbon Saving Policy Tools for Serbia  (A-max,  E-
min applicable)  
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Described results present an initial step in the attempt to create an adequate 
carbon-saving policy mix for Serbia. That’s why we strongly recommend further 
inquiries and analysis in the field.  
As a general conclusion about the option B it can be stated the fundamental 
problem remains to be a lack of compulsion on the macro level. Although it seems easy, 
by using command and control instruments, to compel private entities in business and 
residential sectors, there is no such an anchor on the national level. To solve the problem 
setting up of a national target will be needed. However, by defining a national benchmark 
and imposing the national carbon-saving target, we are close to the Kyoto Protocol 
accession.  
[C] The next policy option is to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but not to accept Annex 
I status. Although not significant in the global terms, GHG emissions from Serbia and 
Montenegro are regionally significant, offering a rationale for a public policy 
intervention. The Kyoto Protocol gives not only the national policy anchor, but it offers a 
set of instruments, so called flexible mechanisms. Those mechanisms are aimed to help 
member countries to meet their commitments, and simultaneously, may have positive 
macroeconomic effects, on employment, technical progress and foreign investments. 
[D] Final option for the national climate protection strategy is to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and to accept Annex I status, as all of the EU countries have already done. By 
choosing this, Union of Serbia and Montenegro will make the closest step to the EU 
accession in the environmental policy field.   
 
Summarizing all of the mentioned, it becomes clear that a delicate choice has to 
be made between the options C and D.  If the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro 
agree to sign the Kyoto Protocol, it will be necessary, before obtaining the Parliamentary 
approval, to decide whether to become an Annex 1 party or not. The answer, and the right 
choice should consist of the following:  
[1] In the course of EU accession, Serbia and Montenegro will accept Annex 1 
status. However it is inadequate to become an Annex 1 country, in the early stage of 
accession process. There are there types of reasons: political, economic and 
environmental-policy reasons. 
a) Political reasons are connected with still unfinished legal foundations of the 
Union. Constitutional definition of Kosovo and Metohoija needs to be clarified. Before 
accepting legally binding quantified constraints on GHG emissions, Serbia and 
Montenegro must have clear legal responsibilities. 
b) Economic reasons can be found in a very deep crisis during 1990s. A period of 
dynamic and intensive growth is needed to solve most of the serious socio-economic 
problems inherited from the previous times. Quantified constraints on GHG emissions 
may hamper economic growth in the early, quantitative, phase. In the later, qualitative 
phase, carbon constraints may help economic development. 
Climate protection effects on development have already been studied in the recent 
economic literature (Babiker and Jacoby, 1999; Babiker, Reilly and Jacoby, 1999; 
Bernstein, et al. 1999; Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux, 1998). “The main conclusions 
drawn in this literature can be summarized as follows: a) the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol negatively affects developing countries - energy exporting countries above all - 
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particularly in the absence of emission trading; b) looses are smaller with Annex B 
trading, and may become gains with global trading; c) economies in transition belonging 
to Annex B, however, suffer relevant economic losses when emission trading becomes 
global. These results support a conclusion that climate policy generally reduces growth 
and welfare in developing countries. In addition, they also show that climate policy 
reduces equity, by inducing larger economic looses in developing countries than in 
developed ones.” (Bosello et al. , 2003: 602). If the conclusion is made only on 
macroeconomic statistics, both Serbia and Montenegro can be considered as developing 
countries and the previous findings are fully relevant for making of the national climate 
protection policy framework. The god side is that Serbia and Montenegro are not oil-
exporting courtiers, and are not expected to face the greatest welfare looses. However, 
energy sector weight in the national economy is quite high, making Serbian and 
Montenegrin economic growth performance highly responsive to carbon saving policies.      
c) Environmental-policy reasons come from the fact that Serbia and Montenegro 
still do not have official information about GHG inventory. The First national 
communication to the UNFCCC should be presented and the exact amount of “hot air” 
should be estimated before any strategic decision is to be made. Before the Kyoto 
Protocol is to be ratified, all potential conflicts of interest, about the emission baselines, 
between former Yugoslav countries, must be solved, especially the conflict between 
Serbia and Croatia. 
[2] Before accepting the Annex 1 status Serbia and Montenegro may be involved 
in CDM projects. Clean Development Mechanisms can be successfully implemented in 
Serbia and Montenegro. With the GDP per capita level of about 1250 US $40, in 2002, 
Serbia and Montenegro are closer to the developing world than to the European industrial 
countries. On the other side, in Serbia and Montenegro a sufficient level of capacity and 
human resources can be found. There should be no impediments for implementation of 
CDM projects, not even in the unilateral form. The most striking advantage of the 
Serbian economy lies in the fact that a high quality human capital, comparable to the 
highest European standards, can be obtained for very low wages, comparable to the 
Central Asia levels41. However, an unacceptably high county risk creates impediments for 
foreign investments42.  
Favorable fields for CDM investments can be found in: a) the Serbian Electricity 
Company (EPS) reforms, that are expected to take place from 2004 to 2007, b) the 
restructuring and modernization of more than forty district heating local companies, c) 
modernization of traffic infrastructure and upgrading of railway facilities, d) organic 
farming and modernization of the conventional animal-husbandry systems, e) 
improvements in the waste management practices, f) exploiting potentials of small hydro-
power plants, g) using thermal, wind, solar and other renewable energy sources43, and h) 
using bio-diesel fuels in agriculture and food processing industry.  
                                                 
40 Approximate estimation of the author. 
41 In 2002, the average monthly gross wage in Serbian economy was 193.3 Euro. (Source: SSY 2002) 
42 According to the EIU 2002 Country Risk Summary  the overall rating for Serbia and Montenegro is D 
(A-least risky, E-most risky) and the overall score is 71 (100-most risky). Political risk is D, Economic 
Policy risk is D, Economic Structure risk is D and liquidity risk is C. (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2002).  
43 According to an international study  (Euroheat & Power , 2001)  the potential of solar energy use in 
Serbia and Montenegro is around 510 • 106 TJ yearly. The same study stated that by using the geothermal 
potential more intensively some 180,000 – 120,000 tons of oil could be substituted yearly.  
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A lucrative field for CDM investing can be found in buildings and communal 
infrastructure sector. Energy saving activities in buildings are totally neglected in Serbia 
and Montenegro. Even new buildings in the residential city districts have been made in a 
very energy inefficient manner44.  Not to mention a booming individual house sector in 
suburbs and in villages. A need for energy efficiency improvements, in all kinds of 
buildings, in Serbia and Montenegro, is urgent. CDM projects in building and 
construction sectors will produce not only energy efficiency improvements, but will 
ultimately have a very positive impact on employment.        
Assuming investment-multiplier effects of the CDM projects, it can be concluded 
that the expected amount of 50-80 million US $ per year in CDM investments45 would 
create 4000-6400 of the new jobs in Serbia annually. This gives a convincing picture of 
the expected economic benefits.    
In a conclusion it can be stated that an optimal climate protection policy for 
Serbia and Montenegro should start with the option C, including all of the domestic 
policy tools mentioned in the B.  Later on, in the course of the EU accession, option D 
will be accepted. When exactly the option D will become relevant depends on: a) future 
of the Kyoto process; b) speed of socio-economic reforms in Serbia and Montenegro and 
their approximation to the accession. Both of the factors are still uncertain.  
By adopting option C, Serbia and Montenegro will become eligible for the World 
Bank financing support. The Prototype Carbon Fund set up in 2000, the Community 
Development Carbon Fund set up in 2002, and the latest, Bio Carbon Fund created in 
October 2003, are aimed to deliver cost-effective emission reductions while promoting 
conservation of biodiversity, reduction of poverty and opportunities for developing 
countries to adapt to climate changes. If Serbia and Montenegro decide to choose options 
A or B, the opportunities offered by the World Bank Carbon Funds would remain 
unexploited. 
To make the chosen policy path operational, the Serbian Government needs to 
designate a National Authority46. The National Authority takes part in the validation 
process and has the responsibility of certifying that projects contribute to the domestic 
sustainable development goals (Rosales and Pronove 2002). 
 For Serbia it would be necessary to create a National Climate Protection Office.  
Besides other activities, connected with the domestic policies, the Office will act as a 
National CDM Authority. Such an Office would be able to integrate CDM investments 
with national priorities, in the most efficient way. The task would also be investing in the 
most lucrative carbon-saving projects and keeping them as a domestic asset. The most 
                                                 
44 In one of the most comprehensive energy studies, ever made for the City of Belgrade (Todorovic, 1982),  
it is stated that, during 1981, the average energy demand for heating purposes in the residential sector was 
140W per square meter, which was much higher than in the EC countries. It can be expected that during 
nineties such figure has become even higher. 
45 According to Mr. Eric Carlson, during 2001 and 2002 the Serbian Electricity Supply Company (EPS) 
removed approximately 2 million t CO2 eq from upgrades to the system, essentially through efficiency 
gains. It is expected that, by 2012, all the planned improvements in EPS system would save about 18 
million t CO2eq. According to Mr. Carlson’s prediction, the size of CDM potential in Serbia would be of 
50-80 million US $ per year, for each of the next ten years. The yields would primarily be oriented towards 
currently state-owned energy and DH sectors (Carlson, 2003).    
46 According to the Constitutional Charter between Serbia and Montenegro, all of the environmental issues, 
including climate protection policy, will be under the jurisdiction of the constituencies.   
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lucrative projects are one with the lowest cost of GHG mitigation per ton. Such projects, 
with costs less than 2,5 $ per ton of mitigated CO2, should be kept under a supervision  
of the National Climate Protection Office, in order to exploit the highest benefit from the 
international emission trading.  
Transaction costs involved with CDM projects can primarily be minimized via 
Designated Operational Entities (DOE)47. It will be necessary to create a number of 
DOEs in Serbia. Introducing a competition would demand from 3 to 7 DOEs in Serbia48. 
Assuming complexity of the DOE’s responsibilities, an international help in the DOE 
creation would be very welcome.  
Besides the CDM activities and the other international programs, the National 
Climate Protection Office will be responsible for the following set of issues: 
a) Data keeping, GHG inventories and all other means of accounting related to the 
climate change mitigation will be under the competence of the Office. Policy options to 
locate the responsibility for GHG inventories in the National Hydro-meteorological 
Institute, Statistical Office or Ministry of Energy and Mining are not favorable. Each of 
the mentioned institutions has some other priorities, and climate protection cannot be in 
their focus. Although each of the institutions is closely related to the climate change 
problem, only a limited set of activities is under their competence. Therefore it would be 
better to designate an institution with broader capacities, and with a strictly focused task, 
to keep the emission inventories as a priority.    
b) The National Climate Protection Office will be responsible for preparation, 
implementation and supervision of the National policy program. Until now, no climate 
protection activities have been set up in Serbia. Significant potentials for “no regret 
policies” exist in Serbia (Table 11). Among a broad range of demand side polices are 
product-labeling campaigns. At the moment, electricity-appliances market in Serbia is 
absolutely opened to all kinds of foreign commodities. Some of them cannot be sold in 
the countries of origin, because they are energy inefficient. Regulatory actions and 
product-labeling campaigns are to be organized jointly with the Energy Efficiency 
Agency.  
Hungarian experience with Energy Service Companies (ESCO) deserves an 
attention (Ürge-Vorsatz and Langlois, 2003). Energy Service Companies are private 
energy-efficiency oriented entities that offer a deal, in form of “build operate and 
transfer” arrangements, to all types of public and private institutions aimed to decrease 
their energy consumption by a variety of actions. Most of the actions are based on the 
technical and organizational improvements in institutions like hospitals, schools, 
administrative buildings, hotels, sport centers etc. In the duration of a performance 
contact (PC) the benefits from the saved energy are shared between ESCO and a host-
company. Three major types of ESCOs exist in Hugary: Classic, American type 
(ownership of the equipment is transferred to the contactor after complementation), 
French type (ownership is not transferred before the conclusion of PC) and Third-party 
financing type (no self-financing, financing is obtained from the outside sources). 
Although domestic legal environment is not as favorable as in Hungary, it may be 
                                                 
 47 DOE are domestic or international independent legal entities responsible for carrying out CDM projects, 
reporting and mediating.    
48 DOE must be registered and accredited by the CDM Executive Board. The size of Serbian economy, plus 
registration and accreditation costs, create limitation for the number of DOEs.     
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concluded that in Serbia a potential for successful ESCO operation can also be found, 
owing to the achieved macroeconomic stability, and improved banking system. The role 
of National Climate Protection Office will be to promote and to institutionally support   
ESCOs, by offering partial guarantees and beneficial tax treatment.          
C) The National Climate Protection Office will manage public education and 
awareness rising campaigns jointly with the Energy Efficiency Agency. In this specific 
area the lessons learned from Poland and Hungary may be very useful. The idea to 
organize a national competition for the best carbon-saving project in the municipal sector 
and to finance the winner may be very applicable in Serbia.     
 
 
6. Conclusion   
 
 
Climate protection policies in the CEE countries offer a wide and a complex 
image of different approaches, measures and instruments. Owing to the common recent 
past most of the CEE countries shared the same energy and carbon problems. However, 
the responses are quite different. Some of the fast reforming economies have already 
achieved significant improvements in many aspects, including energy efficiency, carbon-
saving technologies, environmental awareness and international standards application. It 
is not surprising that fast reformers are closest to the EU accession. A chance of 
becoming an EU member was among the main accelerators of the reforms and growth. 
By adopting the UNFCCC Annex 1 status, most of the CEE countries have committed 
themselves to GHG emission reductions for the 2008-2012 period. According to the latest 
development, the most advanced CEE economies are expected to fulfill the international 
obligations with no difficulty. Even more, the Kyoto Protocol requirements have created 
additional challenges for reforms, and gave pace to the EU integration. The lessons 
learned from the fast reformers present a valuable set of information for the other CEE 
countries.  
Serious political and economic troubles in the early stage of transition, during 
1990s, in some of the West Balkan countries have lead to a total neglect of climate 
protection issues. After a decade of political catastrophes and economic decline the Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro (former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) has a chance to start 
rapid and essential socio-economic reforms and to become a candidate for the EU 
accession. It would be a serious fault in Serbia and Montenegro’s reform strategy if 
climate protection policies were ignored. Without joining international environmental 
treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol, Serbia and Montenegro will be excluded from the 
European integration processes. 
According to the Constitutional Charter adopted in March 2003, the 
environmental policy issues are under the jurisdiction of constituencies, Republic of 
Serbia and Republic of Montenegro. In the proposed Climate Protection Policy 
framework it has been emphasized that the Kyoto Protocol ratification is an unavoidable 
first step. In the initial stage, it would be beneficial for Serbia to exploit the CDM 
potentials in a full range. When the EU accession will become close, in the later stage of 
transition, an Annex 1 status will be accepted, with the full circle of international 
obligations. In the meantime, the National Climate Protection Office will be established. 
 37
The Serbian Climate Protection Office will act as a National CDM authority. The Office 
will also be responsible for GHG inventories keeping and the domestic policy 
implementation. 
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